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Abstract  
Creating social impact as a financial market has received some interest over the last few years. Yet, 
little academic research has been conducted to justify the excitement. This study aims to build on the 
current literature on social impact investment and explores the determining factors of success for 
investments. Instead of using the social enterprise point of view, as other studies before, it gives 
insights from the investor’s perspective. As investors forwardly are concerned about risk and return, 
the social impact creation and its influence on investment success is neglected in the study. For the 
empirical investigation, the paper uses a dataset of over 400 investment transactions made over the 
course of 2005 until 2013. In line with the hypothesis that a longer maturity could potentially hurt 
the investment success, the outcomes show that giving out investments for a longer period of time 
increases the return of investment while simultaneously increasing the change of capital write off.  
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“This is about moving profit-seeking capital into solving social problems,” 
“The shrinking state: should investors fill the gap?” 
 “UBS has become the first bank to make use of new UK tax reliefs for social impact investment that 
help to reduce poverty.” 
- (Financial Times, 2015) 
Those Financial Times headlines above talk about profit seeking in combination with solving social 
problems, they ask whether a socially shrinking state can be saved by investors, and they talk about 
tax reliefs for something called social impact investments. Those statements might have been 
illusionary a few years back but surround us more and more in recent times which makes it well 
worthwhile to take a closer look as to why profit, investors and a bank are suddenly related to terms 
such as social, impact and poverty reduction.  
All around the world, financial markets are under public scrutiny. After the financial crisis and the 
exposed greed, the public demands to go beyond just profit. Grudgingly at first but with an 
increasing interest, the financial market pursues the integration of social factors into investment 
decisions1 (Daggers & Nicholls, 2016). Among those “beyond profit” fields is “Social Impact 
Investment” (SII), a field that has its origins in the United Kingdom (UK) but has spread internationally 
after the UK hosted the Social Impact Investment Taskforce in the G8. The development of SII is 
further fueled by a common paradox that most of us will recognize. The public cries for social 
services to help overcome the consequences of a widening income gap. This goes hand in hand with 
the same population pressuring governments to cut spending to keep debt levels in check. This 
paradox trend helps to further grow the SII market (Hangl, 2014; Jackson, 2013; Nicholls & 
Tomkinson, 2013; Stoesz, 2014). Governments try to outsource social services to social enterprises, 
thereby cutting costs and, in the process, trying to satisfy their voters with lower debt levels and 
social service supply (Allen, 2009; Millar, 2012). Most social enterprises cannot finance themselves 
because they do not generate enough money to have access to the traditional financial market. 
Picking up on the financial needs of social enterprises, a formerly grudging financial market positions 
itself as social impact investor to supply the funds with new enthusiasm (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 
2011). SII comes with a new range of financial products sold to investors who then in turn give 
money to social enterprises that deliver social impact and promise financial return (Kingston & 
                                                          
1 The word “investment” is used to denote a financial transaction in this paper where the investee is expected 
to return at least the principal to the investor 
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Bolton, 2004; Loder, Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Shelupanov, 2011; Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 
2010). However, in comparison to all the praise, the adoption process of SII proceeds only sluggishly.  
One reason for this is investors facing a lack of information on how to engage in SII successfully. Most 
conducted research analyzes SII from the point of view of the social enterprise and gives for example 
suggestions on how to become eligible to SII. To ensure a greater interest in SII from the investor’s 
side, risk and return profiles of social impact investments need to be studied further. Investors feel 
that they do not have enough experience judging a social enterprise business model or feel insecure 
with the characteristics of a SII transaction itself (Hebb, 2013). So far there has not been enough data 
available for a well rounded transaction decision. This increases uncertainty and drives costs of due 
diligence and transactions in general (Social Investment Research Council, 2015). The cost of capital 
for social ventures is, therefore, higher than for their for-profit counterparts in the “normal” financial 
market. The confidence of investors in the social impact investing market must be strengthened by 
developing a stronger understanding of SII to produce more financially successful transactions and, 
thereby, lowering the cost of capital for social enterprises. Therefore, the guiding research question 
is as follows: 
Which factors influence the social investment transaction success? 
This overall research question leads to the following sub-questions that this paper focuses on: 
(1) What is the influence of a learning curve on social investment transaction success? 
(a) Does the number of social investment transactions carried out per year influence the 
successfulness? 
(b) Are more recent social investment transactions more successful than the early ones? 
 (2) How do transaction characteristics influence their success? 
 (a) How does the maturity of an investment influence its success? 
(b) Does the credit total given out to the social enterprises influence the transaction success? 
Investors are still skeptical and suspicious of the investment readiness of social enterprises. Arguably, 
they do not qualify for any type of investment if they fail to attract mainstream capital. This paper 
helps in determining success factors for the SII market. To investigate the identified factors’ influence 
on social investment transactions, this paper first sheds light onto the definition of social investment 
and clarifies terminology. The development of the social investment market in the UK, main financial 
actors, their importance for social enterprises and financial market infrastructure are introduced. 
Further on, the paper draws upon theory of learning curve, agency theory and moral hazard to 
formulate hypotheses concerning the effect of recency, the number of transactions, transaction 
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maturity and credit total, respectively, on the success of social impact investment transactions. The 
paper then describes the data gathering process and explains the methods used in the empirical part. 
The data comes from both a published dataset and is complemented by further information that is 
researched individually. This lays the ground for section 4 which presents the outcomes of the 
statistical analysis. Based on this section, the paper then discusses the findings in depth, combining 
the theory with the statistically obtained knowledge. Practical implications are presented for 
investors, investees and policy makers to highlight how this study can help practitioners. Because it is 
the first time such evidence is invested empirically, a great emphasize is given to limitations of the 
study and towards directions for future research. A concluding section then summarizes the most 
intriguing findings of the study. 
2 Theory and hypotheses 
In the first part of this section, social impact investment is defined and its role for social enterprises 
in the UK. Especially because the market for financial investments is still underdeveloped and most 
concepts and financial products are still new, these sections are critical to the understanding of 
terms and reasoning used throughout the paper. In the second part of the section, a theoretical 
framework of factors is developed that are thought to influence the financial success of social impact 
investments. 
2.1 Introduction to social impact investment 
Giving a certain definition of SII, explaining investor behavior and analyzing SII infrastructure is a 
challenge as the boundaries of the field are blurry. This has several reasons including the recent 
emergence of the field, the lack of institutions, and the variation of application contexts. 
Stakeholders are geographically, culturally and economically dispersed, forming interest groups that 
independently from each other attempt to define boundaries. Furthermore, most literature is 
comprised of practice reports instead of academics where the focus does not lie on the definition of 
concepts and terms. So far, academic research focuses more on other “beyond profit” fields that the 
financial market discovered for itself such as social enterprise finance (Nicholls & Pharoah, 2008). 
Nevertheless, in recent years, a growing number of scholars shows interest in the field of SII 
(Höchstädter & Scheck, 2014) and Lyons and Kickul (2013) have openly called for more academics to 
enter the field in their article about the social enterprise financing landscape. Drawing on their 
findings, the paper introduces the terminology of SII, investor behavior, and SII infrastructure. 
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Terminology of social impact investment 
A literature review of SII shows that there is no common and universal understanding of the 
terminology although several attempts seem to have been made (Daggers & Nicholls, 2016). For the 
purpose of this paper, SII is placed within the main field of “social finance”. This main field comprises 
a great variety of financial instruments that are given to social enterprises in order for them to create 
social and environmental impact. The financial instruments used within this main field range from 
grants and engaged philanthropy to social impact capital that can not only give market returns but 
potentially above-market returns. Included in this main field of “social finance” are other sub-fields 
such as crowdfunding or community finance. Although this paper places SII in this broader context, it 
is very important to distinguish it further as “social finance” does not always encompass the 
repayment of capital by investees (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011). However, the term SII for this 
studies’ purpose refers to investees that aim at repaying the capital with the possibility of even a 
financial return (see appendix A for a differentiation between social impact finance and other types 
of finance). It is investment made to social enterprises that create social impact while still being 
financially responsible in their business model2. Other definitions of SII take on a greater investee and 
social impact approach whereas the definition for this paper lays a focal point on investor 
deportment and stimulus.  
Social Impact Investment Investors 
Understanding the motivation of investors interested in SII and the challenges they face is important 
to lay the ground for tackling the current suspicion and reluctance to invest in SII. There are several 
SII players in the UK and primary investors that fund social impact investments include institutions 
and banks as well as pension funds, insurance companies or development finance institutions (Saltuk 
& El Idrissi, 2015). As far as the motivation of investors is concerned, an extensive survey conducted 
by GIIN and J.P. Morgan (2015) finds that over half of the social impact investors aim to generate 
competitive returns with their social impact investments. The remainder either wants to have a 
return that is below the market return and close to the market rate or wants a below market return 
close to capital preservation. Although “only” half of the 147 surveyed fund managers say they seek 
return, all of them want at least a preservation of capital and 82% want at least a return that is close 
to the market rate. The importance for investors to generate return on investment or at least recoup 
the investment adds to the explanation why they are cautious with SII. Impediments and challenges 
still shape the life of a social impact investor. Investors still regard the dearth of data as a main 
barrier and challenge for SII saying that “while a lot of interest, excitement, and talk suggest the 
                                                          
2 The definition used by the Global Impact Investing Network is: “Impact investments are investments made 
into companies, organizations and funds with the intention to generate social and environmental impact 
alongside a financial return (The GIIN, 2016).  
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trend toward market rate returns on SSI, there is still a lack of returns data to prove the case” (Saltuk 
& El Idrissi, 2015). As far as uncertainties regarding the social business model of social enterprises are 
concerned, the study conducted by J.P. Morgan (2015) finds that investors rank this challenge as a 
lower concern in comparison to previous years. Apparently, investors are now more familiar with the 
social sector although it still remains a challenge. Another challenge is the principal agent theory that 
follows from the information asymmetry in the pursuit of the acknowledged objectives and both 
social and financial returns (Alemany & Scarlata, 2010; Evans, 2013; Achleitner et al, 2013). The 
investors must trust a small group of managers to thoroughly follow the agreed objectives. The 
challenges arising from the investor motivation, the dearth of data and the principal agent theory 
help to explain the skepticism of SII investors. 
Social Impact Investment Infrastructure in the UK 
The infrastructure for SII in the UK is among the world’s best developed infrastructures but 
nevertheless struggles to grow to any comparable size of traditional financial market infrastructures. 
Financial markets need infrastructure to function and social impact investments are no exception to 
the rule. Financial infrastructure is understood as a system among participating parties used for “the 
purposes of clearing, settling, or recording payments, securities, derivatives, or other financial 
transactions” (Dudley, 2012). It should govern transparent arrangements, enforce safety and 
efficiency, soundly manage several types of risk, and provide a legal basis. Figure 1 shows a basic 
infrastructure containing investors that supply the money, intermediaries that offer investment 
support, and investees such as charities on the receiving end. The role of the intermediary includes 
also the creation of communication procedures and standards (Dudley, 2012). For this purpose, 
social stock exchanges (SSE), as part of intermediaries, are needed (Salamon, 2014; Daggers & 
Nicholls, 2016). The UK Social Stock Exchange was founded in 2013 and functions as an information 
provider. A current entry hurdle is that all participating companies must be simultaneously registered 
at the London Stock Exchange and need to pass a social impact test (Chhichhia, 2015). To qualify for 
other social stock exchanges, the main aim of an enterprise needs to be on creating impact whereas 
the UK SSE does not require the impact creation to be the core of the business. The UK SSE still does 
not provide actual trading which could provide a comparable information base about SII and enable 
the creation of market indices. Overall, investors still miss comparable valuations and exits, structure 
of SIIs and help with legal and technical due diligence (Gregory, Hill, Joy, & Keen, 2015). As such, 
there is still upward potential for SII infrastructure in the UK.  
 
Figure 1: Infrastructure of the Social Impact Investment marke
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learning behavior on quality of products and services and find a significant relationship (Levin, 2000). 
To the knowledge of the paper, no academic literature has so far applied the theory of learning 
curves to SII. The theory used to be applied to industries before the Second World War by Wright’s 
investigation of factors influencing airplane costs (1936) and has since been applied to a variety of 
other fields and academically explained (Huber, 1991; Loerch, 1999). Because there is no empirical 
study investigating factors that influence learning in SII, this paper draws upon factors that show to 
influence learning in other fields of application.  
Several learning hot spots add to the learning experience with learning occurring at the external level 
in actors in the environment and at the internal level in individual employees and organizational 
systems (Argote, 1993). The actual improvement of efficiency and quality is a combined effect of the 
two environments. More in detail, there is a long list of factors that are thought to be connected to 
organizational learning. The focal firm learns through external factors in the external environment 
including the learnings by firms that are outside of the focal firm as for example its suppliers. The 
focal firm also learns through internal factors in the internal environment such as standardization of 
procedures, improvements in product characteristics, proficiency of individuals, and improvements 
in equipment (Wright, 1936; Hirsch, 1952; Wheel Wright, 1984; Joskow & Rose, 1985). In terms of 
social impact investments, this means that at the external environment level, the investors learning is 
influenced by factors outside of the bank or fund such as the stock exchanges or intermediaries. At 
the same time, the investor’s learning curve is influenced by internal factors such as standardization 
of procedures and due diligence examinations in dealing with SIIs. It can therefore be hypothesized 
that with more investment transactions occurring over time, the quality and cost of SII is improved 
for the investor. 
Hypothesis 1a: A higher number of transactions per year will have a positive influence on the success 
of social investment transactions. 
Scholars were also interested in the timing of organizational learning and when it would take place 
for the introduction of a new product. It is argued that the learning curve is really rather a function of 
time rather than just the cumulative experience (Zangwill & Kantor, 1998; Levin, 2000). However, 
there are also studies that find there to be no connection between calendar time and learning as 
soon as cumulative experience is added to the model (Lieberman, 1987). It is also shown that the 
rate of learning is higher as soon as the service or product is used more extensively while the learning 
that occurs during a planning phase is slower (Tyre & Orlikowsk, 1994). As SII is a rather recent 
phenomenon, this paper argues that this finding could be transferred to social impact investments. 
Translated to SII, this finding would mean that learning during the earlier years of SII occurred more 
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slower than the learning in later years. If learning can influence the quality and cost of an investment 
transaction, it can therefore be hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 1b: A later transaction period year will have a positive influence on the success of social 
investment transactions. 
2.2.2 Investment characteristics 
As with the development of each new investment vehicle, different characteristics need to be tested 
to arrive at the ideal structure (Alemany & Scarlata, 2010). For SIIs, the ideal structure has yet to be 
found (Chhichhia, 2015). Especially because of the difficult social impact measurements that need to 
be added to the risk and return relationship to price the investment, this has been difficult for SIIs. 
For the purpose of the paper, this special investment characteristic is disregarded because a focus is 
put on the normal risk and return perspective of investors. Other investment characteristics that 
need potential adjustment include the maturity of the investment and the total amount of the 
investment. Both characteristics are discussed respectively. 
Social enterprises have a bad reputation with investors and most that are asked position them as 
unstable and risky organizations that constantly fight bankruptcy (Rumbold, 2014). Positive examples 
such as the London Early Years Foundation show that this is not true. They survived for a century and 
can report a trading income of more than 10 million British Pounds (Blakeborough, 2012). Research 
has also confirmed that social enterprises are not more likely to file for bankruptcy than their private 
sector counterparts. Nevertheless, social enterprises do fail for several external and internal reasons. 
For the scope of the paper, one external reason is particularly important as it has an influence on the 
investor’s side. Social enterprises are very dependent on the legal framework within a country 
(Brandstetter & Lehner, 2015). This framework, however, is subject to constant change. The 
framework can change from being favorable for social enterprises (e.g. tax relieves) to suddenly 
becoming unfavorable. This is beyond the control of the social enterprise but can happen quickly 
with a simple change in government policy. Some countries only classify between charity and for-
profit but the UK momentarily has a legal structure in place that supports the social enterprise hybrid 
model that connects social impact and for-profit constructs (Gregory, Hill, Joy, & Keen, 2015). This 
support structure cannot be taken for granted and the social enterprise is always at the risk to lose 
the favorable status. This challenge is an indicator to have shorter investment maturities instead of 
long ones because of the increasing uncertainties in the far future.  
Another reasoning adding to this proposition concerns the social enterprise’s culture and the 
relationship between investor and investee. Few social enterprises and even less charities are used 
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to think in “generating-profit terms” (Lyons & Kickul, 2013). The prediction of a business model over 
a long time period is more challenging for any organization but even more so for social ones as they 
are more inexperienced with the action. Given the possible external changes and the difficulty to 
make a long-term prediction on the business model success of a social enterprise, this can impact the 
successfulness of SII investment from the investor point of view. Furthermore, the investor and 
investee relationship can give an additional argument towards a shorter maturity because of the 
principal agent theory. Although there is no initial asymmetry of information between the investor 
and the investee, as soon as the investment is made, the control of the investor over what is exactly 
done with the investment lessens. This information asymmetry strengthens with a longer maturity of 
investment (Bergemann & Hege, 1998). The investments given out to social enterprises can be 
distinguished by their different maturity terms and because of the increasing uncertainty with a 
longer time horizon as well as the increase in agency costs, it can by hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 2: A longer maturity of social impact investments, has a negative influence on the success 
of a social investment transaction. 
Another characteristic of SIIs that might still need adjustment is the credit or investment total given 
to the social enterprise. The short track record of closed investment transactions leaves investors 
wondering and sometimes widely speculating as to what investment characteristics might influence 
the success of SIIs (Achleitner et al, 2013). Because SIIs are still quite new, some investors fear to lose 
too much money by investing a large sum in the social enterprise. They, furthermore, think that 
tempting a social enterprise with a high investment might make them more prone to moral hazard 
than traditional investees. They base this suspicion on the fact that the social enterprise has only 
limited options to secure financial means and might overestimate their business model to secure an 
investment deal out of desperateness (Bergemann & Hege, 1998; Stoesz, 2014). Also, because of the 
earlier mentioned asymmetry of information and the, therefore unobservable allocation of the 
investment, the investee could “shirk” and hide parts of the investment by diverting it to other 
causes within the enterprise (Bergemann & Hege, 1998). This, in turn, can hurt the successfulness of 
an investment. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 3: The credit total has a negative influence on the success of a social investment 
transaction. 
After developing factors that theoretically should determine the success of a social investment 
transaction and hypothesizing the direction of the relationship, this paper introduces the data and 
method utilized to test the hypotheses. 
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3 Data and methodology 
This section of the paper is concerned with the nature of research and the data collection process. It 
also discusses and defines the dependent, independent and control variables. Hereafter, the 
statistical analysis is briefly introduced. 
3.1 Nature of research 
As the topic of social impact investment has come up only recently, most practice reports and 
academic articles make use of exploratory and qualitative techniques. Most conduct expert 
interviews or case studies to infer knowledge about social investments. The paper builds on an 
existing body of qualitative studies on the investment readiness of social enterprises and the 
willingness of financial providers to invest in social enterprises (Mulgan, Reeder, Aylott, & Bo'sher, 
2010). In contrast, however, the developed hypotheses in this paper can be tested empirically and 
the gathered dataset as well as the quantifiable variables allow the paper to use a quantitative 
approach. It must be considered, however, that due to the recency of the topic, the paper does not 
build upon tested empirical measurements. It is, therefore, still exploratory in nature as the defined 
measures have not been tested in the field of social impact investment transactions. This paper 
might be able to contribute to the methodological growth within the field of social investments from 
the investor’s point of view.  
3.2 Data collection and sampling 
Data on individual transactions in the social investment market is difficult to obtain as it is normally 
not publicized data. Furthermore, to draw conclusions about the overall social investment market a 
sufficiently large dataset must be obtained. This means that data from several players must be 
gathered and combined. In the UK alone, there are about 30 different Social Investment Financial 
Intermediaries (SIFIs) and there is no standardized form or framework on what data to collect or in 
which format the data should be. This paper gathers data on the financial risk and returns of social 
investment transactions published by EngagedX. Founded in 2012, EngagedX’s mission is to enable 
mainstream capital to be used in a way that brings positive outcomes for all. EngagedX brought 
together independent and anonymized data of a key segment in the UK social investment market 
from 2002 until 2014. CAF Venturesome, Key Fund and Social Investment Business cooperated to 
collect the data while the Boston Consulting Group assisted with an external validation of the data. 
To the knowledge of the author, there has been no published academic study so far that utilizes this 
data. It offers, among other variables, information on the investment principal (amount actually 
invested), the return (yield and capital appreciation), maturity (duration to redemption / exit), and 
11 
 
risk (actual write offs and defaults). Hereby, the focus is solely on financial return and purposely 
neglects the social impact created. Transactions gathered for the dataset were picked from the very 
risky edge of the market including investments to the so called “unbankables” of the market. The 
sample encompasses only performance of UK transactions. 
The unit of analysis of the study is at an individual transaction level whereas each transaction 
contains one or more draw down transactions. The transactions include equity and debt investments 
ranging from £2,400 to £2.7m with some of the loans backed against a fixed asset, debenture or 
guarantee. The sample frame includes all transactions that were already completed by the time of 
the analysis. Of 1041 collected transactions, 426 closed ones are selected. Open transactions needed 
to be excluded because they cannot offer information on the risk and return relationship, namely the 
success of the social investment. Although the dataset includes a data range from 2002 until 2014, 
the years of 2002-2004 were excluded as they could potentially introduce bias. The three primary 
years only contained 7 transactions in total and can be regarded as a pilot-test phase of social 
investing where risk and return patterns where still try and error. 2014 only included one transaction 
as all others have not been completed and has, therefore, been removed as well. This leaves the 
sample with 417 transactions between 2005 and 2013 to analyze.  
Information on control variables is gathered from a variety of online sources such as the worldbank 
and Eurostat. As the transactions are anonymized, each of the added variables is matched with the 
year of the transaction. The exact source for the respective variable is mentioned with the 
description of the variables. 
For the analysis, the sample is not further randomized but a non-randomization sampling method is 
chosen, namely consecutive sampling. This method pursues to hold all accessible subjects as part of 
the sample. With regards to non-random sample methods, this sampling technique can be 
considered as favorable because it contains all data points that are available that makes the sample 
more indicative of the population (Field, 2009). Since the investment transactions are anonymized a 
subjective selection bias is very unlikely. 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
The success of a social impact investment is normally measured in its risk and return profile together 
with the created social impact. Because of the focus of this paper, this is neglected. To measure 
success, the effect of several variables onto both capital write off (risk) and return on investment as 
the two dependent variables are investigated. 
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Capital Write Off. The variable Capital Write Off catches the risk of an investment. For each 
transaction in social investments it is important for the intermediary, or financial provider, to recoup 
the investment and avoid write-offs. A transaction can be claimed successful to the provider if it is 
able to have no capital write off. Whether capital is written-off is captured by the dataset for each 
transaction. The goal is to clearly distinguish between a success and a failure. Therefore, the financial 
transactions are clustered into two groups, namely transactions that did not experience any write off 
and transactions that experience either partial write off or full write off. This dummy variable is 
named SUCCESS in the SPSS data output and has assigned a 1 for transactions that do not experience 
write off and 0 for transactions that experience any kind of write off. This makes unsuccessfulness, 
having to write off capital, the baseline of the model. It should be noted that the successfulness 
could also be captured by the amount of capital written off, so a ratio variable. As the aim is to 
investigate in one of the hypotheses whether a higher credit total affects success, taking the total of 
write off would bias the statistic towards assuming higher write offs for higher credit totals 
automatically.  
Return on Investment. In accordance with literature and practitioners, another part of a successful 
social investment transaction that is not captured by capital write off is the return on investment 
(Saltuk & El Idrissi, 2015). The return on investment is dubbed ROI in SPSS and is a continuous 
variable. Return on investment is measured in percentages with a high percentage being more 
successful and favorable for the investor in comparison to a low percentage. 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
Credit Total. It is hypothesized that the amount of investment, the credit total, has an influence on 
the success of the investment. For each social investment transaction, the credit total invested into 
the social enterprise is published. As the data only concerns transactions from the UK market, all 
entries are made in British Pounds. The variable is dubbed CREDTOT in SPSS. The descriptive statistics 
in table 2 (see section 4) show that the distribution of credit total is highly skewed. To normalize the 
distribution a long transformation is used. As the long transformation does not work for zeros, the 
dataset was searched for any unfit transaction. There was no credit total of zero discovered so that 
no value of 1 had to be added to each transaction.  The new variable is displayed as lnCEDTOT in the 
output. 
Number of Transactions per year. The number of transactions per year is bound to have an effect on 
the successfulness of social investments. This refers to the internal learning process. The gain of 
experiences and knowledge of the financial intermediaries in dealing with social enterprises, their 
needs and business models should lead to less write offs. They are better equipped to judge what 
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social enterprise is investment ready. The number of transactions per year is dubbed NUMBTRAN in 
SPSS and is a continuous variable. 
Maturity. The maturity of the investment is likely to influence the success of a social investment 
negatively. The data set offers the duration of the investment transactions measured in between the 
date of the first draw and the last cash flow event. Maturity is dubbed MATURI in SPSS outputs. The 
unit used is moths and it is counted as a continuous variable. 
Number of transactions per period. The point of time in which the transaction happened is bound to 
impact the successfulness of the social investment. With the hypothesis that external learning will 
have occurred and better social investment infrastructure is in place, the time series is divided into 
two groups, early years and later years. The early years reach from 2005-2009 and the later years 
from 2010 until 2013. This categorical dummy variable takes 0 for the early years and 1 for the later 
years from 2010 until 2013. This variable is dubbed TRANSPERIOD in SPSS and is a categorical 
variable. 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
# Transactions 47 24 21 49 56 58 89 52 21 
Table 1: Number of transactions per early and later years.  Source: own illustration 
3.2.3 Control variables 
Count of social enterprises. The count of social enterprises is likely to influence the success of social 
investments. With more social enterprises, more social investment transactions are demanded to 
provide enough money for each enterprise (Karanikolos, et al., 2013). Therefore, controlling for the 
count of social enterprises in the UK over the time span of the data set is necessary. The required 
information is not published in the data set used to examine social investment transactions. As social 
enterprises do not underlie a closed definition, the paper made sure to use the same source for each 
year of social enterprise count. The regularly conducted “Social Enterprise Market Trend Survey” by 
the UK government uses the “very good fit definition” for social enterprises for all years and offers 
the required information. This variable is dubbed SOCIENT in the SPSS outputs. 
Count of Social Investment Financial Intermediaries. Social Investment Financial Intermediaries 
(SIFIs), dubbed SIFIS in SPSS, actively invest in social enterprises and charities. Over the years, this 
count has seen some advancement. Because a higher number of intermediaries influences the 
available social investment infrastructure and adds to the learning effect of existent intermediaries, 
this variable needs to be controlled for. The research report “Growing the Social Investment Market: 
The Landscape and Economic Impact” by Big Society Capital in cooperation with BMG Research sheds 
light onto the count of intermediaries in the UK over the applicable time frame.  
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British Interest Rate (BoE). The British interest rate influences the rate at which intermediaries and 
banks are willing to give money to investees. The required rate of return, so one part of the success 
formula for desired social investments, can also depend on this rate. Therefore, the variable, dubbed 
BOE in SPSS, must be controlled. The British interest rate is decided by the Bank’s monetary policy 
committee and is each month voted upon (Bank of England, 2016). The Bank of England publishes 
the rates for all years since 1694 and the applicable time frame was used for the coming analysis. As 
there were sometimes up to four different interest rates within one year, an average of the rates 
within one year was taken to match it to the dataset.  
Persistent Poverty Count UK. To live in poverty means living off a salary that is below 60% of the 
national median. This threshold is commonly used by both the EU and the UK (Office for National 
Statistics, 2016). The Office for National Statistics and Eurostat publish the UK average persistent and 
overall poverty rates for the respective years as a percentage of total population. For the purpose of 
the analysis, the rate of persistent poverty is used. To convert this percentage to a total count, a 
population size of 64 million (World Bank, 2016) is assumed. For the purpose of this paper, the count 
of persistent poverty is thought to negatively influence the success of social investment. A higher 
count of poverty goes along with an overall difficult state of economy, thus, increasing the chance of 
investment write offs (Karanikolos, et al., 2013). This variable is dubbed POVRATE in SPSS.  
For a summary of the SPSS coding of variables see Appendix B. 
3.3 Statistical Analysis 
Having the different types of dependent variables to test, ROI as a continuous variable and SUCCESS 
as a categorical variable, two different statistical techniques are required to conduct a statistical 
analysis. For the continuous variable ROI, ordinary least square regression (OLS) is applied. Because 
the variable SUCCESS is categorical in nature and a dummy variable, logistic regression (logit) is used 
to conduct the statistical analysis. For both models, hierarchical regression is used which allows to 
add variables in different stages to the models. For each step, the explanatory power added to the 
model can be observed. Also, with the control variables entered in the first step, the different effects 
of control variables and the variables this paper is interested in are distinguished. For an easier 
comparison of the two models, OLS and logistic regression, the order of the variables entered was 
kept the same in both analyses.  
The results of both analyses are shown in the next section of the paper. 
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4 Analysis and results 
In the analysis and results section, first the descriptive statistics are presented which are then used to 
evaluate statistical assumptions for the OLS regression and the logistic regression. With these 
assumptions sufficiently satisfied, both regression models are run with SPSS and the outcomes are 
depicted.  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 and table 3 show the outcomes of the descriptive statistics analysis in SPSS. Table 2 portrays 
the analysis for the continuous variables whereas table 3 highlights the statistics for the categorical 
variables SUCCESS and TRANSPERIOD. In total, the sample contains 417 transactions with a mean of 
99.788 £ in total credit given out by the financial providers. The highest transaction documented is 
over 2687400 £ and occurred in year 2011 with a maturity of 37 months until repayment. Already 
interesting to see is the negative return on investment (ROI) of a mean of -0.15. Negative 15% of 
return on the social investments made with of course a minimum of -100% which occurs for 
investments that experience a full write-off and are not repaid at all by the investee. It is, however, 
hopeful to see that a maximum return on investment of 0.592 was achieved. Overall, the mean 
repayment maturity lies at about 29 months although the longest maturity took 109 months which 
was then fully written off. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables 
Because the descriptive statistics table 2 shows high skewness and kurtosis values for CREDTOT, the 
variable was log transformed to lnCREDTOT. With a high skewness value, the distribution of the 
variable is clustered at low values whereas a high kurtosis value can be interpreted as having 
variables that are rather clustered in the middle without having extremes (Field, 2009). The log 



















Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the categorical variables 
This paper would like to test the determinants for a successful social transaction with two different 
variables for success, one being continuous (ROI) and one being categorical (SUCCESS). Per 
operational definition, OLS regression and a logit model are used to test both variables. For each 
model, the statistical assumptions must be checked. OLS regression needs to be tested for normality, 
linearity and homoscedasticity while both models need to be checked for multicollinearity and 
outliers (Palllant, 2011).  
Multicollinearity. Table 4 presents the correlation matrix among the tested variables. The fields 
highlighted with an asterisk contain values that require statistical attention.  There is a strong 
correlation between ROI and SUCCESS which can be disregarded as both variables are tested in 
different models and not used together. As they are both supposed to measure the overall 
successfulness of an investment it is a good sign they are correlated. For the remaining variables 
showing significant correlations, it needs to be checked whether they pose a threat to the planned 
analysis. To check for multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance can be used 
as proxies (Field, 2009). Tolerance values that fall below 0.1 and VIF values above ten signal for a 
problem with multicollinearity (Palllant, 2011). Except for the variable SOCIENT, all values and VIFs 
are well apart from the designated threshold (Appendix E).  
 
































































ROI ,878** .044 1
MATURI -.075 ,290** .090 1
NUMBTRAN -.053 -.089 -.088 -,150** 1
TRANSPERIOD -.022 -,298** -.066 -,415** ,507** 1
SOCIENT .004 -,225** -.058 -,377** ,660** ,745** 1
BOE -.020 ,242** .033 ,355** -,561** -,765** -,897** 1
SIFIS .038 -,191** -.039 -,359** ,493** ,654** ,890** -,772** 1
POVRATE -.032 .036 -.018 ,104* -,656** -,481** -,364** ,406** -,212** 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).




Outliers. According to Pallant (2011), the creation of boxplots can help identify significant outliers 
that differ from the other data points within the sample. SPSS identifies outliers when they are more 
than 1.5 box-lengths from the box. In case outliers are identified, their bias inducing influence on the 
analysis can be further checked with a comparison of their means against their trimmed means. For 
this sample, lnCREDTOT, MATURI and NUMBTRAN contain identified outliers. For further evaluation 
of a potential threat of bias, the means of the variables were compared with their trimmed means. 
SPSS showed: 
 Ln CREDTOT MATURI NUMBTRAN 
Mean 10.7358 29.01 55.62 
5% Trimmed Mean 10.7179 27.66 55.69 
Tabel 5: Trimmed mean check 
The 5% trimmed mean is calculated by removing to top and bottom 5% of values. Since both the 
mean and the trimmed mean are very close in all three variables, the cases were not removed from 
the sample.  
Normality. The normality assumption must hold for the OLS regression analysis and can be visually 
assessed by looking at the histogram and the normal probability plot (Palllant, 2011). The histogram 
and the normal probability plot in appendix C both suggest a fairly normal distribution. For a 
histogram, a bell-shaped curve is ideal, whereas, with the normal probability plot, a straight diagonal 
is desirable. Although the plot in appendix C shows some bumps along the diagonal between the 
observed residuals on the x-axis and the expected residuals on the y-axis, the general picture is still 
of a normally distributed data.  
Linearity and Homoscedasticity. Appendix D shows the scatterplot testing the assumption of linearity. 
It plots the standardized residuals against the regression standardized predicted values. For this 
purpose, new variables needed to be created in SPSS. The linearity assumption is fulfilled if the 
values plot around the line without forming a curve. This assumption holds for the tested data so 
that it is safe to assume linearity. This also defies any suspicion of heteroscedasticity which would be 
a potential threat in case the variability in the regression standardized values increased or decreased 
with the predicted values (Wooldridge, 2009). 
From the checked assumption, the paper is now able to perform both statistical tests, namely the 




This section first illustrates the outcomes of the OLS regression testing the return on investment for 
social investments. Then, the findings for the riskiness of social investments are presented by the 
means of the logistic regression.  
4.2.1 OLS regression of Return on Investment (ROI) 
Table 6 and appendix E present the results of the ordinary least square regression analysis of return 
on investment. Model 1 includes only the control variables. They have been entered into SPSS first as 
they are expected to explain some of the underlying variation but are not supposed to explain away 
the entire association. Adding one unit of POVRATE, so the number of people living below the 
poverty line, decreases the return on investment rate by 5%. Although this finding is not significant, it 
does fit to the reasoning of adding the number of people living in poverty to the control variables as 
it decreases successfulness of social investment. Also, the variable becomes significant in Model 2-4 
with the same relationship direction on return on investment. Apart from POVRATE becoming 
significant in later models, neither of the control variables has a significant effect on return on 
investment in Model 1-4 at the 0.01. 0.05 or 0.1 significance level.  
Model 2 tests the hypotheses 1a and 1b with adding TRANSPERIOD and NUMTRAN to the model. 
Both variables bear a significant influence on return on investment at the 10% and 5% level 
(respectively) of significance. However, though being significant, both variables have coefficients 
opposite of the hypothesized direction. TRANSPERIOD is a dummy variable with early periods (year 
2005-2009) as a baseline. With one added unit of transactions per later periods (2010-2013), the 
return on investment rate decreases by 0.123. Also, adding one unit of transaction per year 
decreases the rate of return. This time, the effect is not as drastic as the return only decreases by 
0.004. Therefore, hypotheses 1a and 1b are not supported. Overall, the variables only capture 1.2% 
of the underlying variation within the data (adjusted R²: 0.012). The change in R², however, is 
significant at the 10% level and thereby adds value to the overall power of the model.  
The effects of investment characteristics, namely maturity and investment total on return on 
investment are analyzed in Model 3 and 4 respectively. Adding maturity in months in model 3 only 
very slightly improves the models adjusted R² from 0.012 to 0.015 which is not significant. Although 
the variable shows the hypothesized direction, with one unit of added maturity showing an increase 
in return on investment of 0.002, the influence is not of significance. Adding the investment total 
(lnCREDITOT) in Model 4 actually decreases the adjusted R² and shows an extremely high p-value of 




Table 6: OLS regression of return on investment 
4.2.2 Logistic regression of no capital write off (SUCCESS) 
Table 7 and appendix F present the results of the logistic regression analyzing the effect of several 
variables on the likelihood of capital write off in social investment coded SUCCESS. To improve 
comparability between both models, the variables have been entered in the same sequence as with 
OLS regression. Equally as model 1, model 5 includes only control variables. With a logistic 
regression, R² or adjusted R² do not exist to demonstrate the explanatory power of the model. As R² 
fits a line through the data points and measures the squared residuals between the fitted line and 
the data entries, this is impossible to do with a categorical variable (as there is only 0 and 1). To, 
nevertheless, judge the power of the model, Nagelkerke adjusted pseudo R-squared is used. It was 
decided to use this proxy instead of the, by SPSS suggested, Cox & Snell's pseudo R-squared. In 
contrast to Cox & Snell, Nagelkerke’s pseudo R-squared can reach up to 1 and is better to compare 
with the normal R² used in the other model. The explanatory power of Model 5 lies at 1.5% which is a 
better fit than Model 1. The number of SIFIs in the market is significantly positive related to the 
success of social investments. This supports the hypothesized direction of the control variable and 
adds power to the argument to include it as a control.  
Dependent Variable: ROI
Variable Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 Model  4
Constant 1.341 1.08 0.877 0.847
POVRATE -0.053 -0.189** -0.186** -0.185**
SIFIS 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004
BOE -0.892 -1.563 -1.4 -1.414
SOCIENT -0.000005934 -2.458E-07 3.551E-007 3.562E-007
TRANSPERIOD -0.123** -0.099 -0.097
NUMBTRAN -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**
MATURI 0.002 0.002
lnCREDITOT 0.002
R² 0.008 0.026 0.031 0.031
Adjusted R² -0.001 0.012 0.015 0.012
Change in R² 0.008 0.018 0.005 0
R² change F tes t 0.855 3.717** 2.255 0.016
N 417 417 417 417
Note: Uns tandardized coeffi cients  are reported




Model 6 and 7 test the hypotheses 1a and 1b, adding both the transactions per period (early period 
versus later period) and the transactions per year. Increasing the unit of transactions per year is 
significantly negative related to the successfulness of social investments. Both variables, again, show 
a direction that goes against the hypothesized one. Adding the variables increases the Nagelkerke 
adjusted pseudo R-Squared which indicates an explanatory power of 3.9%. Looking at the -2 Log 
likelihood, however, raises some doubt. In general, Log-likelihood values cannot be used individually 
as an index of fit as they are a function of sample size. However, they work well to compare the fit of 
different coefficients (Field, 2009). In the data output at hand, the Log likelihood decreases from 
Model 5 to Model 6 which is a sign of a weaker fit of variables.  
Model 7 and 8 which tests the influence of investment characteristics by adding maturity and credit 
total, show the highest explanatory power in terms of pseudo R-squared (5.1%) in Model 8. Maturity 
has a significant, negative relationship with write off likelihood meaning that an added unit of 
maturity decreases the chance of fully recovering the investment. This is significant at the 10% level 
and supports hypothesis 2. Again, the variable credit total is not significant and has a very high p-
value, showing its insignificance and failing to support hypothesis 3.  
 
Table 7: Logistic regression of having no write off on investment 
Dependent Variable: SUCCESS
Variable Model  5 Model  6 Model  7 Model  8
Constant 9.399 8.874 10.234 9.346
POVRATE -0.29 -0.992 -1.034 -1.003
SIFIS 0.057* 0.05 0.051 0.049
BOE -10.435 -10.827 -12.371 -12.507
SOCIENT 0* 0.00 0.0000 0.0000
TRANSPERIOD -0.629 -0.781* -0.745*
NUMBTRAN -0.022** -0.021** -0.021**
MATURI -0.011* -0.012*
lnCREDITOT 0.061
Chi -square/df 4.438/4 11.64/6 14.826/7 15.190/8
Adjusted Pseudo-R² 0.015 0.039 0.05 0.051
-2 Log l ikel ihood 501.414a 494.211a 491.026a 490.661a
N 417 417 417 417
a. Es timation terminated at i teration number 5 because parameter estimates  changed by 
les s  than .001




The findings of the two models are discussed in the next section. 
5 Discussion 
The discussion session reflects upon the statistical outcomes from section 4 and matches them to the 
hypotheses that were developed in section 2. The findings are then discussed together with the 
literature reasoning. After the discussion, the paper acknowledges its limitations and points towards 
future fields of research and practical implications to further advance the topic of SII.  
5.1 Return on Investment on social investments 
Model 1 of the regression shows the influence of control variables on the return on investment. 
None of them is significant but run into the expected direction. Nevertheless, including the variables 
did not seem to have shown any alternative explanation factors influencing the return on 
investment. Therefore, they could be excluded from the model in future research. Based on the 
theory of the learning curve, the paper hypothesized that both a higher number of transactions per 
year and an investment at a later point in time positively influence the success of investments. 
Although model 2 shows a significant influence for both variables on the return of investment, the 
hypotheses 1a and 1b are both refuted. The hypotheses expected a positive relationship but the 
model shows the opposite. For 1a, with every added transaction per year, the return on the 
investment decreases. Looking at table 1 again from section 3, it can be seen that most transactions 
occurred in both years after the financial crisis. Because interest rates were rather low after the 
financial crisis occurred and about 4% higher before 2009, this could explain the found relationship 
direction in the two variables (Bank of England, 2016). 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
# Transactions 47 24 21 49 56 58 89 52 21 
Table 1: Number of transactions per early and later years.  Source: own illustration 
For hypothesis 1b, the theory of having more learning occurring in later years (Tyre & Orlikowsk, 
1994) cannot be supported from the model. This could be because SIIs have taken a long time to 
come from a first plan to the first implementation. Having the years 2005-2009 defined as early years 
could exactly be the phase in which a high utilization was reached and most learning took place. That 
the return on investment is then found to be lower in later years could be again due to the 
aftermaths of the financial crisis. The claim of Liebermann (1987) that there is no connection 
between learning and calendar time, however, cannot be supported, as both variables are significant. 
Overall, the explanatory power of the model improved from adding both variables although the 
explained variation is still very low. Model 3 adds the maturity variable into the model. Hypothesis 2 
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claims that a longer maturity has a negative influence on the success of a social investment 
transaction. This draws upon the political landscape’s influence on uncertainty, the social 
enterprise’s culture and principal agent theory. The variable is not significant and indicates the 
opposite relation as compared to the hypothesis. With each month of maturity, the return on 
investment increases. This, however, does support the hypothesis because it means that the 
investment becomes riskier with longer maturity. Although there is only a change of 0.2% in return 
on investment given for each added month and there is no statistical significance at the 10% level, 
the p-value, however, is at 0.13. This is still enough to expect some truth between the introduced 
theory in connection with SIIs. Future research should try to rebuild the model using a different data 
set to investigate this. In model 4, the investment amount was added to the model. It was 
hypothesized that there would be a negative influence on the success of the investment which 
cannot be supported. This shows that the investors’ concern about running into the risk of moral 
hazard by offering “too much” investment to the social enterprise is not supported by evidence. The 
high p-value of almost 0.9 and the lowered adjusted R² in comparison to model 3 provides the 
indication that this variable has no influence on the success of the investment. 
5.2. Risk of social investments 
In model 5-8, the factors discussed before where tested on their influence on investment success, 
this time measured by capital write off vs. no capital write off. Looking at the descriptive statistics in 
table 2 again, it should be highlighted that only 29.5% of the investigated investments did experience 
partial or full write off. To put this into perspective, the figure is compared to the experiences of the 
Enterprise Guarantee Scheme, a scheme founded by the UK government to support SMEs in the UK. 
They show a very similar write off rate and are somewhat comparable to social impact investing 
(Social Investment Research Council, 2015). Therefore, investing in social enterprises is not riskier 
than investing in other SMEs. The Social Investment Research Council (2015), however, points out 
that the expected return for SIIs is lower than would normally be expected with mainstream  













Table 2: Descriptive statistics of categorical variable 
investment products. In the logistic regression, model 5 shows that the added control variables have 
significant effects on the likelihood of investment write off. Having more social financial 
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intermediaries does indeed increase the chance of having no investment write off and, therefore, 
supports the expected direction. Also, although not significant, the influence of the British interest 
rate goes in the expected direction which makes intuitive sense. With a higher base interest rate, 
investors are likely to charge a higher price for giving out money so the cost of capital increases again 
for the social venture (Achleitner et al, 2013; Bank of England, 2016). This increases the chance of 
capital write off. Model 6 includes the added variables that draw upon the learning theory. Here, 
again both hypotheses 1a and 1b are refuted. The number of transactions per year is a significant 
variable but points into the opposite direction of the hypothesized one. With each number of 
transaction added, the chance of having no capital write off decreases. The same explanation as 
given in section 5.2.1 can be used to explain the phenomenon. Adding the variables does add 
explanatory power to the model just as before in the OLS regression. Adding the variable maturity in 
the next step of the model gives significant support to hypothesis 2. It does seem to be the case that 
a longer maturity investment has a lower chance of being fully recovered and increases the expected 
return on investment as it becomes more risky. This supports the theory that there seems to be a 
connection between at least one of the suggested explaining theories. To investigate whether the 
unstable policy framework, the social enterprise culture or the principal agent theory explain the 
observed phenomenon best, future research could conduct a separate in-depth analysis of the 
connection between maturity length and investment success. The logistic regression, furthermore, 
supports the findings of the OLS regression concerning the investment total. There seems to be no 
connection between the success of a SII and investment total whatsoever, refuting hypothesis 3 and 
the moral hazard suspicion of investors. 
5.3 Practical Implications 
This paper offers some important implications for social impact investors, investees and policy 
makers which are explained in the following.  
The purpose of this paper is to help investors to overcome prejudices against social impact investing 
and understand more about the risk and return profile. By investigating success factors for 
investments, the overall quality of the investments can be enhanced. It offers the notion that 
investment success does not only depend on the investors themselves but also on external factors 
such as the market infrastructure. Furthermore, investors may understand that a learning process 
taking place internally will potentially help to make investments more successful. As far as the 
characteristics of the investments are concerned, it should be noted by investors that a longer 
maturity has a slight negative effect on the likeliness of success. By rejecting hypothesis 3, the long-
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standing rumor of saying that social impact investment totals should not be too high in order to avoid 
moral hazard problems can be contradicted. 
Another group that can draw practical implications from this study is the social enterprise group. This 
paper adds to the understanding of investor motives and tries to show what they are looking for in 
an investment. Having a better understanding of investors can help make investees more investment 
ready. They are better able to prepare for investment negotiations and can meet the worries and 
expectations of investors before the investment deal might fail. Also, because there seems to be no 
relation between the total sum of the investment and success, social enterprises have a stronger 
argument to press for the investment sum that is required. 
For policy makers, this paper offers some information on their role in facilitating the relationship 
between investors and investees. Providing a secured legal framework around social enterprises to 
help them through difficult financing phases decreases the uncertainty for investor decision making. 
Important is that this legal framework needs to be protected from the sometimes unstable political 
environment that tends to change every 4 years. 
5.4 Limitations and future research 
The overall academic literature on SIIs is scarce and literature on the perspective of the social impact 
investor is barely existent. Success factors of SIIs have not been researched before from the investor 
perspective and this paper is a first attempt to fill this gap. Also, it is the, or one of the first studies to 
empirically investigate the risk and return relationship of social impact investments. So far, only case 
studies and survey methods have been used to shed light onto this field. It is, however, in the 
interest of the market, to test the developed frameworks with gathered data that is slowly becoming 
more available. This study has a variety of limitations and can point to effective future research 
areas. First of all, the decision making process that social impact investors go through should be 
thoroughly analyzed to develop a better understanding of the different touch points that add 
challenges (Dudley, 2012). With a developed framework, it can be ensured to consider all possible 
influencing variables throughout the process. As there was no academically developed investment 
decision making process for SIIs, this paper may have overlooked a great deal of potential factors 
that influence success of investments. 
Following the scope of this paper, an important and complex part of the social impact investment 
success formula has been disregarded. Social impact needs to be measured and priced accordingly by 
the investors (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2014). As there had not been a comprehensive method to price 
social impact into the risk and return formula by the time of this paper, maybe future research will be 
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able to use a framework to empirically test the effect of social impact on the risk and return profile of 
the investments. 
Also, due to a limited amount of data available by the time of this research, more in-depth analyses 
of the risk and return profile of SIIs were not possible. A segmentation of investments by social 
impact field for example could add an interesting perspective as to what social field is more suitable 
to these investments (Gregory, Hill, Joy, & Keen, 2015). By more in-depth data that is not restricted 
to anonymization, details of investment contracts and the application and research process per 
transaction could be analyzed together with its effect on the successfulness of the investment. Due 
to the anonymous investment data, any conclusions about the preparation or the influence of the 
choice of social enterprise were impossible. 
 Another important step for future research is the validation of this study’s results. One concern is 
the dataset. The investment data was gathered over a time frame that was highly influenced by the 
investment crisis in 2009. It is difficult to judge how this has influenced the investor’s investment 
willingness, their motivation and the risk and return profile of social impact investments. Considering 
the time it took for the financial sector to come back to its feet, it is doubtful whether the effect of it 
has already worn off in the data. As soon as more years of data are available, this can be checked by 
excluding the years around the financial crisis. Another limitation is the high multicollinearity that 
was observed for the control variable SOCIENT. The relation between the independent variables and 
the dependent variables could lead to a distortion and incorrectness of the results (Field, 2009). 
Consequently, future research should try to test (1) the same variables but with a different dataset 
and (2) other variables on the same dataset. 
6 Conclusion 
Social impact investing is hailed as a great solution to overcome the financing gap for social 
enterprises and at the same time being able to give the financial market the opportunity to discover 
its heart in financial decision making. The social impact finance sector in the UK is outlined and 
different motivations and characteristics of investors taken from academic literature are analyzed. 
The study shows that investors do care about social impact but only after a reasonable return on 
investment is realized. Also, recouping the investment and not experiencing any write off is a must 
for investors. Both, return on investment and likeliness of experiencing write off are investigated for 
determining factors. This paper is one of the first to empirically investigate the SII market and the 
factors contributing to a financially successful investment experience for the investor. It is 
hypothesized that both the learning occurring in the market and at the investor’s sight, as well as 
investment characteristics influence the return on investment and the likelihood of default. The 
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outcomes of the study suggest that maturity of the investment seems to have a negative effect on 
success. Although no other success factors could be identified, it should be mentioned that a 
persisting rumor about the effect of supposedly too high investment sums could not be supported 
which is a good sign for social enterprises looking for investments. The paper offers important 
practical implications for investors, investees and policy makers that should help to further grow the 
SII market. Overall, it must be noted that social impact investments are not riskier than comparable 
SME investments in the UK and, therefore, represent a viable investment opportunity. 
  
